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INTRODUCTION 
Assessing news distortion and bias in reporting, 
whether induced through ignorance or through deliberate 
policy, is an important problem in international mass communi-
cation research. News bias can create a distorted picture of 
reality and aid the development of an ethnocentric outlook. 
This, in turn, can hamper efforts in establishing understanding 
and international cooperation. 
A classic example, involving the media, is the 
distortion caused in translating the oft-quoted Khrushchev 
remark, uwe will bury you.• 
Klineberg notes "this has usually been interpreted 
in its active sense, that is, •we will destroy you• or •we 
will conquer you 1 ." Variations include "We~ going to bury 
you• and "We intend to bury you." 
Klineberg points out that the translation •we will 
bury you• is literally correct but •in the sense that 1 We will 
outlive you, 1 or •we will still be alive when you are dead'." 
The phrase is meant to express the belief that •communism will 
outlive Capitalism, not that the Communists will violently 
destroy the West." 1 
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r--. 
. .......,_ 
2 
Accurate newspaper accounts are necessary because 
they give meaning to what they portray and at the same time 
provide the concepts and imagery through which related events 
and phenomena may be understood. In international mass 
communication, the media's function might be seen as ainter-
---preter -s of the world," enabling the reader to learn how to 
__.. 
interpret and evaluate various aspects of the world. 
Nedia-relayed knowledge is of primary importance 
in providing frames of reference or perspectives within which 
the reader is able to make sense of international events and 
his ~wn experience. 2 Thus, the media might be seen as providing 
a 0 measure of reality by which to interpret the world's events.n3 
Bias and news distortion can provide a false view of what 
reality is, as manifested in the translation of Khrushchev's 
remark. 
An erroneous view of reality can aid the development 
of an unrealistic picture of the world's events. And, as 
Allport has pointed out, ignorance is one of the most important 
barriers to international understanding. 
How strong an impact the media have in this area 
is difficult to assess. But the meanings which events and 
situations are given are likely to be consistent with the 
cultural values with which the media are most closely identified. 
Thus, the media of a Western democracy could conceivably be 
inclined to give more favorable coverage to those countries 
which are perceived as being similar. 
- --- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
J 
It is with the intent of maximizing international 
understanding and minimizing ~ocentricism that the necessity 
of balanced, objective news coverage (as free from cultural 
bias as possible) is required. 
A recent British book, Publish it Not: The Middle 
East Cover-Up, by Michael Adams and Christopher Mayhew, asserts 
there has been misinformation in the British press concerning 
events in the Middles East which has not been accidental, but 
rather •crucial facts were deliberately disguised or suppressed 
4 in Western countries by pro-Israel pressures and propaganda.• 
Its authors further claim "the purpose was to perpetuate the 
imbalance of power in the Middle East in the interest, not of 
peace or international harmony and certainly not of justice, but 
of the one country that stood to gain from the status quo: 
Israel • • 5 
These are serious charges which have not been leveled 
sol~ at the British press. Arab participants in a recent 
editorial conference sponsored by the U.S. Overseas Press Club 
•scorned what they called the 1 Zionist-controlled media• and 
accused them of obscuring loss of property by Palestinians and 
economic and physical hardships suffered by Arabs because of 
U.S. aid to Israel since 1948.•6 Journalist and Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) member Shafik al-Hout noted: 1 The 
chief problem facing the Palestinians is to convince the news 
media that they (the Palestinians) have been the principal 
victims of the Israeli-Arab dispute since 1948.•7 
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In the 1954 International Press Institute (!PI) 
Survey, "The News from the Middle East," an American 
correspondent in the Middle East said: •The main 'restrictive 
practice' does not exist in the Middle East at all, but in 
the United States itself. American editors are nearly all 
afraid to tell the truth about the Israeli-Arab controvery 
because of the Zionist lobby.• 8 
Another Middle East specialist noted: •Not many 
editors of American newspapers are really impartial in the 
treatment of news concerning the Middle East. If Arabs are 
involved in events contrary to Western policies or Western 
interests, such stories are generally amply covered and 
displayed prominently in the American press. But if events 
happen that are favorable or in line with policies of the 
Middle Eastern states, these are often ignored.u9 
How serious and relevant are these charges today? 
Arab uni t,y and the formal use ·or oil as a political weapon 
(oil production cutbacks and embargo of exports to Western 
markets) mark a shift in power. While Washington has denounced 
the Arab tactics and coercion, the oil embargo has been a 
driving force in the u.s. peace-seeking efforts in the Middle 
East. •Petrodollars: the billions of dollars accumulated from 
oil sales, perpetuate the oil producers• political strength. 
And in response, the United States appears to be assuming a 
position which is more compatible •with the principle of what 
is right and just toward the Arab occupied territories and the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.• 10 
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Zionists, too, often claim news bias in favor of 
the Arab states and frequently equate it with anti-Semitism. 
The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) devotes 
considerable time to counteracting propaganda from the 
11 petro-diplomatic complex," defined a as a coalition of oil 
lobbyists, diplomats and educators with cultural and theological 
interests in the Arab world.• 11 Representatives of the 18 Arab 
states send a constant stream of propaganda to the u.s. Congress. 
While there are indications of a movement toward 
presenting a more balanced picture of the Middle East--a strong 
need still exists to examine American newspaper content and 
coverage to determine the political objectivity of news stories 
in light of persistent criticisms. 
This research paper will address itself to the 
problem of news flow from the Middle East, cultural difficulties 
in reporting the news, problems of pressure group influence 
on editorial policy and editorial bias. 
Additionally, it is important to assess to what extent 
news distortion -affects editors as well as readers. Here it 
is important to also keep in mind that newspapers are most 
often dependent on the international news agencies for news 
supplied from the Middle East. 
the 
the 
A specific research proposal will be developed for 
study of possible distortion and bias concerning news of 
r11ddle East in U.S. daily newspaperj' 
_.~ 
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The Problem of News Coverage from the Middle East 
Reporting the news from the Middle East is a complex 
and difficult assignment. The absence of •common denominators• 
between East and West, the difference in languages and problems of 
working in a culture with •few points of contact with that of 
their own• 12 makes the Middle East story hard for a western 
correspondent to understand and more difficult to communicate to 
the public at home. Few western correspondents have managed to 
learn the Arabic language well enough to keep informed of 
developments by the local press or the cultural subtleties to 
•read between the lines• to understand fully what is happening 
in these countries. 
In developing an understanding of some of the basic 
problems of news from the Middle East, a study of particular 
importance for background perspective is the 1954 IPI Survey, 
"The News from the Middle East.• For data, the IPI relied 
primarily on critical judgments of the press itself. Questions 
on the nature and problems of news coverage were addressed to 
newspaper editors, foreign editors, foreign correspondents and 
specialists in the area. The study focused on the eight states 
of the Arab League--Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi 
- (l.. 'A,.d Arabia e8Q Yemen~the Sudan, Arabia as a whole, Iran and Israel. 
Its purpose was to test the adequacy of existing news coverage 
i n l ight of •censorship, costs and commun1 cat ion. "13 
7 
Censorship emerged as a particular handicap in reporting 
news from the area. The threat of expulsion is an ever-present 
one for foreign correspondents, and government pressure on 
nationals (used by many news agencies to report news from the 
area) may be so overwhelmingly heavy as to seriously affect the 
tone and content of stories. 
Government intimidation was noted for all Middle East 
countries. This was true not only or Arab countries and Iran, 
where restrictions are onerous, but also to some extent, Israel. 
8 Local men are inclined to close their eyes to things 
displeasing to their country. I do not mean to suggest that 
there is a regime of fear, but I know of cases in which excessively 
objective Israelis have been made to feel the displeasure of the 
Public Information Office of the Foreign Ministry,• reported an 
American correspondent. 14 
Reporters also encountered suspiciaa and oppositon in 
searching for news. Reasons cited included: 1. The low esteem 
in which journalism, as a profession, is held in parts of the 
Arab world. 2. The handicap of belonging to a foreign nation 
when failure of that nation to support a Middle Eastern country 
often reacts on the individual correspondent. 3. Constant 
confrontation with suspicious Arabs, who, well aware of the 
bad press they have in America, are reluctant to give out 
information for fear it might be used against them. 4. Attempts 
by Arab authorities, who regard reporting of their areas as 
unfair, to limit the view of the foreign correspondent to as 
narrow a field as possible.15 
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"Israeli propagandists succeeded in putting over 
such an unjust picture, for example of Iraq, in the foreign 
press while journalists working there were unable to get space 
to tell the unsensational truth--that the authorities found it 
hard to believe that anyone ever tried to tell the truth,• 16 
noted a British journalist. 
Arab-Israeli Travel Embargo 
Arab-Israeli conflict has .only intensified problems of 
reporting the area. Free movement between Israel and the rest of 
the Middle East hampers the correspondent from obtaining an over-
all picture of the area. The tendency of the world press has 
been to leave Israel to be covered by the Israelis and to send 
the foreign reporter into the Arab world. The contrast in tone 
of the reports from the two areas has embittered Arab leaders and 
peoples. Most correspondents agreed that spending time on one 
side or other of the Arab-Israeli fence made it practically 
impossible to obtain a balanced picture of the whole area. 17 
A British foreign edito~ experienced as a correspondent 
in the area, observed: 1 There is a serious lack of confidence 
between the Middle East governments and the press of the world 
for which the governments are not wholly responsible. Western 
editors and agencies have their share or responsibility. The 
Middle East as a whole is ignored except when things go wrong 
and then is very often misreported. Reports are slanted according 
to the prejudice and national interests of the countries involved.• 11 
. ,_.. 
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~ was another factor cited by the survey in providing 
adequate news coverage in the Middle East. The area itself is 
~
vast, sp~~ing 2,0o~m11es and twelve countries. The size and 
number of countries involved dictates that costs would be pro-
hibitive for many agencies if a correspondent for the capital of 
each country were assigned. News agencies try to solve this 
problem by basing correspondents in two or three capitals (Cairo, 
Beirut, Teheran, Tel Aviv) and employing, wherever possible, 
nationals of the country being reported • 
Communications also present significant problems. In 
most capitals, communication channels were inadequate to handle 
the volume of traffic. Correspondents competed for wire 
•priority• at costly •urgent rates• which limited news stories to 
the 'barest essentials.• 19 
Survey Conclusions 
The IPI survey found that with combined handicaps of 
censorship, costs and communications in reporting Middle East 
news, the world press was largely forced to rely on the large 
news agencies for coverage. Quality of Middle East coverage was 
ranked by contributors to the survey as •generally poor• with 
•good• reporting by a small percentage of newspapers who made 
serious efforts to cover the region. 
Those newspapers providing •good coTerage• combined the 
elements of continuous reporting, adequate background information 
and informed editorial comment. Despite this, they drew 
criticism for being too narrowly political with coverage confined 
t o one or two countries. 20 
. r-.. 
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General coverage by the world press was criticized 
as being superficial, incomplete and sensational. Main 
criticisms were: 
1. Lack of material explaining the background of 
events reported. 
2. Geographical uneveness of coverage: comparatively 
too much attention to Egypt, Iran and Israel, too 
little to the other countries in the area • 
3. 
4. 
.5. 
Too great a concentration on political news, too 
little on economic and social news which often 
shapes and portends political developments. 
Distortion and bias in reporting and comment, partly 
through ignorance, partly through deliberate policy. 
Too thin coverage by experienced senior foreign 
correspondents: too much of the news gathering left 
to less well qualified local correspondentsp who have 
the additional disadvantage of being nationals of 
the extremely sensitive countries they are reporting. 
6. Poor handling of the news received on the desk and 
consequent lack or stimulus to the reporter in the 
field. (21) 
Onesalient observation of respondents was that 
"considerable better use could be made of available material if 
those in the home office of the newspaper knew more about the 
subjeet.n22 News agencies complained that often a well-backgrounded 
story was cut to an extent which made it barely intelligible. 
News Bias and Distortion 
One of several criticisms about news coverage in the Middle 
East was that reporting often suffers from bias, either through 
the reporter's own predilections or through his newspaper's poli cy . 
Bias may be political , or more broadly, racial. 23 
~. 
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In general, contributors thought the distortion of 
Middle East news by deliberate use of false information was rare, 
but that distortion occurred for two reasons: 
First, distortion sometimes sprung from ignorance on the 
part of the reporter; because of his inability to get all the 
facts and because of restrictions imposed on his reporting the 
facts. An example cited was the over-simplified reporting of 
French newspaperstaking "the easy line of attributing all 
developmenmin Iran to Communist propaganda, usually without 
seeking to distinguish between the effects of Communist scheming 
and genuine national aspirations.•24 
The second, more serious cause, was the deliberate 
slanting of news to produce a certain effect in the reader's 
mind. This was attributed to a prejudice on the part of the 
reporter or the policy of his editor. 25 An example given by a 
British specialist was news coverage about the behavior of an 
Egyptian major in the Sudan. Major Saleh Salem, Egyptian 
Kinister of National Guidance, visited the Sudan in the summer 
of 1953 to promote Egypt's case in the coming elections. During 
his tour he took part in a "fantasia• (celebration) and was 
photographed during the ceremonies dancing 1 d~shabille" (without 
clothes). wbereupon, the British press nicknamed him the 
•Dancing ~lajor" (one newspaper referring to him as •underpants 
Salem•). 26 
·_,....-. 
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These papers neglected to point out that British 
officials in the Sudan had often taken part in these dances with 
the Sudanese tribes as a complimentary gesture. And, that •in 
Western eyes the exhibition was neither dignified nor decent, but 
in the eyes of the Sudanese and or the Arabs generally, it was 
little more remarkable than the 1 exhibition" of the squire or 
parson taking part in a game of darts at the village local.u 27 
The type of coverage this .story received in British papers 
was attributed by the specialist as being due either to the desire 
of the reporter to make a graphic headline or the political 
impulse to represent Egyptian behavior in the Sudan 1n an 
unfavorable light. 28 
Whatever the cause, the Arab reaction to the British 
news coverage of the story was intense. "Reports and comments 
came back to the Sudan at once and were published and broadcast 
all over the Arab world. In many quarters they were represented 
as a subversive attempt by the British to discredit their opponents 
on lines that were neitherjustified by the past nor pertinent 
under any condition.a 29 
Bias may also spring from the correspondent's own 
particular beliefs. Many foreign correspondents admitted the 
atmosphere in which they worked in the Middle East was so 
heavily charged with emotionalism about rights and wrongs--of the 
semi-colonial Arab country asserting itself against its former 
8 protectorw and of the Arab versus the Jew--that they found it 
difficult to remain objective.3° 
13 
"The Americans appear to be sending a well-rounded 
picture from most parts of the Middle East except Israel. Here 
most correspondents are won over by the Israelis because of the 
little state's valiant struggle for existence. They give little 
emphasis to the bleaker side of life there. One seldom reads 
about sub-standard living conditions, exorbitant prices, black 
markets and discrimination against Israeli Arabs. Instead we get 
a picture that is all milk and honey," observed an American 
correspondent.31 
A British specialist on the Middle East noted that 
English newspapers "give a reasonably accurate picture of Egypt 
and Israel when there are not direct British interests at stake. 
But, as soon as these come on the scene, reporting is more in 
the nature of political warfare than objective coverage.n32 
American Institute for Political Communication Report 
A more recent study was completed in the aftermath of 
the Middle East Six Day War (1967) precipitated by Nasser's 
blockade of the Gulf Aqaba and the resultant •pre-emptive• 
Israeli air attack. The American Institute for Political 
Communication issued a special report entitled •Domestic 
Communication Aspects of the Middle East Crisis." The report's 
purpose was to provide an •overall view of the manner in which 
the u.s. government, daily newspapers and key interest groups 
sought to communicate with the American public at the height of 
this Middle East crisis."33 
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The Institute is a •non-partisan, non-profit organiza-
tion dedicated to improving the flow of government and political 
affairs information •••• through independent study, analysis and 
reporting of the dissemination process.u34 While this was a 
broad study of communication during the period between May 23 
and May 29, 1967, part of it focused on analysis of news stories, 
editorials and columnists in ten major U.S. dailies, media access 
of special interest groups and content of congressional speeches. 
News Stories 
A comprehensive analysis of how ten of the nation's 
major newspapers handled news during this period was conducted • 
Papers surveyed were nearly all "elite, quality" morning 
publications, representing major geographical divisions in the 
United States. These papers had 8 per cent of the nation's 
daily circulation and 20 per cent of its morning circulation. 
Newspaper circulations ranged from about 200,000 to more than 
750,000. Analysis revealed the following: 
1. General in-depth coverage by all papers with 
variations in the scope of such coverage, and 
considerable dependence on •authoritative, officials 
and related sources• not specifically identified. 
2. 
3. 
East and West coast news coverage was more extensive 
than South, Southwest and Northwest--while Midwest 
papers showed great variation. 
The single most often quoted source for the 
1 lead or top story was President Nasser of Egypt. 
In more than 50 per cent where Nasser was a 
primary source, the headline and/or lead paragraphs 
focused on those aspects of his statement which 
portrayed him as belligerent, threatening or 
uncooperative in furthering peace efforts.• 
. r 
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Editorial Oninions 
An analysis of editorial opinions expressed in these 
same ten papers, revealed: 
1. General editorial condemnation of Egypt's blockade 
of Aqaba. 
2. General support of the Israelis. 
J. Emphasis on employing the United Nations to resolve 
the crisis, and general reluctance to commit u.s. 
troops unilaterally. (J6) 
Newspapers on the East Coast were ranked as "more 
agressive• in their support of the Israeli position than those 
elsewhere in the country. 
Columnists 
Syndicated columnists based in New York and Washington 
produced a flood of columns, during this time period, which dealt 
with the situation in the Middle East. There were 18 columnists 
surveyed with a circulation ranging from 50 to 60 papers to 
Drew Pearson, whose syndicate claims a circulation in excess of 
600 papers. Most columnists had a circulation of about 100 
different papers. Results were: 
1. A substantial number took a position favorable to 
Israel which went beyond the announced policy or 
the United States government. 
2. Columns sympathetic to the Arab countries were 
•virtually non-existent.• 
J. Of 18 columnists publishing 58 columns, only one 
wrote a column which set out the difficulties, 
problems and needs of the Arabs, and pointed up 
the situation of the Arab refugees. Combined with 
another columnist who viewed the situation in 
"long-range• terms--this amounted to two neutral 
columns--the rest were ranked either pro-Israel 
or pro-U.S. policy. 
r--, 
15 
4. Most top level stories attributed to Israeli 
government sources opened in a way which tended 
to place the Israelis in a cooperative or 
defensive light. 
5. Most statements attributed to Nasser were based 
either on Cairo Radio broadcasts or on articles 
appearing in the Egyptian newspaper, Al Ahram. 
6. Most statements attributed to the Israeli government 
and coming out or Israel were based on discussions 
with Israeli officials who often were not 
specifically identified. (35) 
There was not enough data . available to merit conclusions 
about news story placement and headline. 
But this study does indicate the need for further 
research and concern about Middle East news story sources and 
thematic qualities assigned to those sources. It is intereting 
to note that while Nasser appeared as the primary source in 
over 50 per cent of the news stories--statements attributed to 
him were actually derived from •secondary sources• such as 
Cairo Radio broadcasts and Al Ahram. Here again, literal trans-
lation may pose additional problems. 
Those statements attributed to the Israeli government 
were actually based on •primary sources,• that is actual 
discussions with Israeli government officials. Finally, the 
question should be asked about what the relationship is between 
primary and secondary sources and thematic qualities attributed 
to each side. Further research is indicated in the need to 
determine how and why the presentation was made of Nasser as 
ubelligerent, threatening and un-cooperative• while Israelis 
were presented as •cooperative and defensive.• 
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17 
4. A small majority of the columnists viewed the 
crisis chiefly or exclusively from the perspective 
of u.s. foreign policy. ( 37 ) 
Acknowledging the general pro-Israel stance taken 
by columnists and reflected in editorial opinions combined 
with preliminary indications of source differences and qualities 
attributed to these sources in news stories; indicates a need 
for further research to determine how editorial opinion might 
be reflected in news stories and edi·torial judgements about 
news stories. Factors to be considered in this regard would 
include strength and extent of editorial opinion, as well as 
news story tone, length, placement and headline. 
Media Access, Lobbyists and Public Ooinion 
Three additional factors related to news bias and 
distortion, those of media access, lobby groups and direction 
of public opinion, should be briefly reviewed in understanding 
the news about the Middle East. 
The American Institute for Political Communication 
Survey noted that many organizations issued position statements 
on the Middle East crisis in the crucial two-week period 
immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities on June 5. 
It was observed that •the media gave some of these statements 
massive 'pla~' buried others so that they could not be easily 
perceived, and mentioned some not at all."JS 
- ,....... 
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Serious questions about fair and balanced coverage 
can be raised concerning media access or lack of access by 
established interest groups during this period. Organizatins 
taking anti-Zionist or pro-Arab (these are not synonymous) 
positions in connection with the Middle East crisis reporte~ 
they experienced great difficulty in getting their views 
published by the daily press in the peri~d immediately preceding 
the outbreak of hostilities. The re·port made no mention of 
pro-!srael or anti-Arab organizations experiencing difficulty 
in getting their views published. 
The American Council for Judaism (a Jewish, anti-
Zionist organization) said a press release issued on May 29 
to wire services, some 200 major dailies and 75 Washington 
correspondents and others, was virtuallY suppressed by the 
daily press. The Chicago Tribune and the New York Times made 
•very brief" reference to the statement, which called for: 
"A recognition of the deep problems developed over the fifty-
year history of the conflict, urged all Great Powers to bring 
both sides to the conference table• and •urged American Zionists, 
most of whom are fellow Jews, to cease and desist from perhaps 
well-meaning but ill-advised efforts to pressure the u.s. govern-
ment into always taking absolute and militant pro-Israel positions.") 
The American Friends of the Middle East reported that 
a letter sent on· May 31 to the editors of the Washington Post, 
Washington Star and New York Times was published in the Post on 
June 8 •after several phone calls: was not published by the 
-Star and was rejected by the Times. 
-----
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Their letter urged viewing the Aqaba blockage within 
a historical context and stated: 1 An Israel abiding by UN 
resolutions and at peace with its Arab neighbors can be the 
only goal consistent with American national interests--and, 
in truth, Israel's real interest."40 
The Arab Information Center's press statement of 
May 31, was issued to the press associations, a number of news-
papers and all Members of Congress. · A spokesman said •no daily 
publish~d the statement or any part of it."41 
This statement cited a distortion on the part of various 
news media in the presentation of the factors and facts leading 
to the crisis. and said: •As a result of this gross distortion, 
the average American could hardly be expected to form a true and 
impartial opinion of the Israeli-Arab dispute.n 42 The statement 
then sought to put the immediate crisis into context by citing 
precedents in international law, incidents of Israeli agression 
and threats against Syria, and raised a question about the 
status of Arab refugees. 
Congressional speeches at this time also reflect strong 
pro-Israel sentiment. During the period between May 23 and 
June 8, 1967; 146 Senators and Congressmen representing 35 states 
placed 226 statements in •The Congressional Record• relating in 
one way or another to the Middle East crisis. About 98 per cent 
of the statements or speeches took a position favorable or very 
. 4 
favorable t o r srae l . 3 
·---
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This pro-Israel political response might call to 
mind President Truman•s philosophy in regard to Israel, which 
has been intimately involved in American domestic politics 
ever since Truman decided to work for its creation after World 
War II. 
Truman's decision to do so ran counter to the advice 
of U.S. diplomats who served in the Middle East. When they 
warned that support for Israel would jeopardize American relations 
with the Arabs and damage wider American interests in the Middle 
East, Truman reportedly replied: 1 I 1m sorry, genclemen, but I 
have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the 
success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands of 
Arabs among my constituents.•44 
In looking at special interest groups and lobbyists, it 
is readily apparent that Arab-Americans are .heavily outweighed 
by American Jews in both numbers and financial resources. The 
Jewish Statistical Bureau estimates that 5.9 million Americans 
are Jewish, while the Arab Information Center estimates there 
are between 1 and 1.5 million persons of Arab ancestry living 
in the United States. 45 
Lobby groups operate in the United States on the behalf 
of Israeli interests and Arab interests. Zionism, as a political 
philosophy, has been established here since the 1890's, and was 
as instrumental force in the campaign for the partition ot 
Palestine. 
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The American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
{AIPAC) is the Jewish umbrella organization which keeps 
watch in Congress over the Israel and United States ties. 
Supported by non-deductible contributions, the AIPAC 
operates on a budget of $200,000 a year and represents 
major Jewish organizations on Capitol Hill. Jewish fund-
raising organizations are not part of the AIPAC umbrella, 
a measure taken to protect their tax· deductible status. 
AIPAC chairman, I. L. {Si) Kenen said in a 1974 interview, 
•I rarely go to the Hill, there is so much support for 
Israel that I don•t have to go.•46 
On the other hand, groups representing Arab 
interests are relatively young and still rather ineffective 
in changing congressional sentiment on Middle East policy. 
The National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA), while not 
officially registered as a lobby, is an active umbrella 
organization for other Arab interest groups. Established in 
1972, the NAAA 1 s activities are financed by membership dues 
and contributions. While declining to reveal donation totals, 
the NAAA counted 1,000 contributors (voting members) donating 
between $25 and $5,000 each in 1974. (The dues and contributions 
are not tax deductible). 47 
......_,_ 
( 
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Causes of the relative weakness in representation 
of Arab interests in the past, have been sought in explanations 
of disunity within the Arab-American community, lack of 
pro-Arab leadership on the national level and the tendency of 
middle-class and professional Arabs to assimilate into the 
American mainstream. 48 
But sheer size and financial resources help account 
for the discrepancies between the two groups. From 1948 to 
1968, the United Jewish Appeal provided over ~1 billion in 
aid to Israel. 49 During the October 1973 war, American pledges 
of cash gifts and purchases of Israeli bonds reportedly 
climbed to the $300 million level. In comparison, during 1973, 
the United Holy Land Fund, an Arab-American organization, 
launched a fund with a modest goal of $200,000 for war relief. 
Religion, too, plays a part in generating strong 
sympathy for Israel. While 5.9 million Americans are of the 
Jewish faith, there are only about 235,000 Muslims. Though the 
nation's people have no strong identification with the Muslim 
religion, Christian churches have supported Judaism and have 
condemned anti-Semitism. Public outrage at Nazi Germany's 
attrocities committed against Jews further swings public 
opinion in favor of the Zionist cause. 
Public opinion in the United States reflects an 
overwhelming support of Israel. Gallup surveys show the same 
basic pattern of support for Israel has existed in 1967, 1969, 
1970 and 1973: about 50 per cent sympathetic to Israel, less 
than 10 per cent sympathetic to the Arabs and the rest uncommitted 
or opin1onless.5° 
2J 
In evaluating the Gallup survey, problems of validity 
and accuracy in polling,particularly in regard to the •don't 
know" or uundecided 1 categorie~ should be kept in mind. 
Hennessy points out that these categories are often inadequately 
interpreted and generally underestimated. People are reluctant 
to admit lack of knowledge of a situation, and question structure 
and interview situations can combine to make it easy for 
respondents to give definiteanswers even though they may have 
no knowledge of the situation. This may lead to serious error 
in measuring real opinion. 
It is also important to keep in mind that the Gallup 
surve~reflect the effects of a large Jewish population and 
small Arab population in the United States. 
With this background information--indications of 
news bias and distortion, sources and overallstory tone, media 
access or lack of access, pressure groups, political, public 
and editorial opinions--a strong case emerges for an investiga-
tion of the nature and relationship between u.S. newspaper 
editorial sentiment and news coverage of the Middle East. 
Most newspapers seek to maintain an independent 
presentation of editorial opinions and news. The.standard of 
balanced, objective reporting of inherently political news 
issues is an accepted ethical obligation of the American press. 
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With regard to the U.S. government's historical 
identification with and openly expressed support of the state 
of Israel, it would be useful to have objective techniques 
to determine how much editorial support daily newspapers give 
to Israel. If editorial opinion is found to be either 
predominantly •pro-Israel" or •pro-Arab," it would be equally 
interesting to observe whether these sentiments are reflected 
in or affect the placement, emphasis and tone of news stories 
concerning the Middle East. 
HYPOTHESIS 
The hypothesis for this proposed study is that 
U.S. daily newspapers will reflect a consistent "pro-Israel• 
sentiment in editorial opinions. It is hypothesized that 
"pro-Arab• sentiment will be minimized. It is further 
hypothesized that editorial bias on the part of a newspaper 
could lead to news distortion in tone, placement, length 
and headlines assigned to news stories concerning Israelis 
and Palestinians. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
All editorials and front pages, on specific dates, 
will be examined in five U.S. daily newspapers to determine 
what relationship or similarity might be expressed between 
editorial statements and news story tone and placement. 
Conversely, the question of what influence front pages might 
have on editorial views will also be considered. 
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Measures would include: reader attention score, 
thematic content analysis and overall column inches including 
jumps (stories continued inside the paper) within each 
category. 
As Budd has noted, •content analysis is a systematic 
technique for classifying message content and message handling 
it is a tool for observing and analyzing the overt communication 
behavior of selected communicators.•'1 In this study, content 
analysis will be employed as a means of classifying content 
in terms of direction using the following thematic categories: 
pro-Israel; anti-Arab; pro-Arab; anti-Israel; and Neutral or 
Balanced. 
Classifying both editorials and front page news stories 
in the presence or absence of these categories should make clear 
the relationship between front page news stories concerning the 
Middle East and editorial views expressed on the editorial pages. 
Additionally, editorials and news stories within each 
thematic category will be counted and measured in terms of overall 
column inches in order to determine how much space articles 
falling within each category are given by the newspapers. 
Reader attention scores will also be calculated for 
news stories appearing on the front page. While this is a 
somewhat subjective method of evaluation and not perhaps an 
accurate index of the readers• attention--it should shed light 
on the subjective evaluations editors make and the importance 
they assign to various news stories about the Middle East. 
,----. 
~ 
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Budd's method of measuring the attention score of 
~ 
news stories based on a five-point so. •.ale will be used. This 
'-._./ 
score is based on the length of the story, its page position 
and heading width; and the method is readily adaptable to 
measurement of political orientation in news stories. The 
attention score is ranked on a scale of 0 to 5, based on the 
following measures: 
1. 
2. 
News story headlines: zero for one-column heads; 
one point for two columns or more, two points 
for any number of columns greater than half the 
page width. 
Page position: one point for news story in the 
top half, zero for a story in the bottom half of 
the page. 
J. Length of story: one point for a story J/4 
column long or more, including pictures if any. 
(52) 
Comparison and analysis of the the results will be 
utilized to determine the validity of the hypothesis and to 
establish what, if any, influence editorial attitude has on 
news direction as well as how front page news stories might 
effect editorial opinion. 
Categories 
As in all content analysis studies, the categories 
will have to be redefined and elaborated in more detail after 
the study data is compiled. 
Concepts Defined: (1) pro-Israel; (2) anti-Arab; { J) pro-Arab; 
(4 ) anti-Israel; and (5) Neutral or Balanced 
.---
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pro-Israel 
Conceptual - Israel is a pro-Western democracy, which 
has a unique right to exist. The u.s. sheuld support Israel 
with financial, political and military backing. Palestine is 
viewed as the ancient cradle of the Jewish civilization, and 
rightfully belongs to the Jewish people, particularly in 
repatriation .for injustices suffered in Nazi Germany. 
Operational - Editorial opinion favorable to Israel. 
Israelis portrayed as cooperative and defensive. News stories 
reflect favorable, positive coverage of Israel. News placement 
and headlines favorable to the Israeli cause. Israeli guerrilla 
activities minimized. 
anti-Arab 
Conceptual - Arab hostility threatens the very 
existence of the state of Israel. Arab nations are portrayed 
as having united in the common cause of 'destroying the tiny 
democracy of Israel,' and are using oil as a weapon ot blackmail. 
Arab nations are portrayed as wanting to "push Israel into the 
sea 11 and as anti-Jewish or anti-Semitic. 
Operational - Editorial opinion condemning Arab tactics. 
Palestinians and Arabs portrayed as belligerent and threatening. 
News stories reflect unfavorable, negative coverage ot Arab 
nations. News placement and headlines unfavorable to Arabs. 
Palestinian guerrillaactivities given maximum publicity and 
condemned. 
-r · 
r · 
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pro-Arab 
Conceptual - Arab nations seen as having the 
right to unify politically and economically as other alliances 
such as the European Economic Community have. Oil embargo 
viewed as a "peaceful solution• to the problem of western 
arm shipments to Israel. Palestinians viewed as being unfairly 
dispossessed of their homes and property. 
Operational - Editorial opinion acknowledging 
Palestinian rights and claims and urgingisrael to take a mo~ 
active role in solving problems in the Middle East. News stories 
reflect favorable, positive coverage ot Arabs. News placement 
and headlines favorable to Arabs and the Palestinian cause. 
Palestinian guerilla activities minimized. News stories 
concerning life in Palestinian refugee camps. 
anti-Israel 
Conceptual - Israel has setzed lands unfairly during 
the 1967 war and has refused to obey U.N. resolutions. Israel 
should recognize legitimacy of Palestinian clams and its own 
social and financial responsibilities in the situation. Israel 
should return lands seized during the war. 
Operational - Editorial opinion condemning Israeli 
tactics. Israelis portrayed as agressors and raids on Palestinian 
camps given maximum publicity and condemned. Follow-up news 
telling effects of Is raeli bombing of camps. News stories reflect 
unfavorable, negative coverage of Israel. News placement and 
headlines unfavorable t o Is rael. 
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Neutral or Balanced 
Conceptual - Recognition of the Middle East problems 
within the historical context of their development. Conflict 
in claims acknowledged: Jewish homeland may be the "cradle 
of civilization" yet Arabs have made their home in Palestine 
for the past 1,000 years. Recognition of the roles of the 
British, French and U.S. in influencing the development of 
Israel. Roles of the U.S. and USSR acknowledged in respect 
to financial and military backing of r:iddle Eastern countries. 
Operational - Editorial opinion presenting a balanced 
view and histori~al perspective on the situation. And, 
acknowledgir.gthe necessity of including the Palestinians at 
the conference table. Balanced coverage, news story placement 
and headlines given to news stories and guerrilla activities 
on both sides. Negative and positive aspects of Israeli and 
Arab societies evenly presented. 
All editorials pertaining to the Middle East (Israel, 
Palestinians and Arabs) and appearing in these papers on 
specific dates will be analysed in terms of editorial di~ction: 
pro-Israel; anti-Arab; pro-Arab; anti-Israel, and Neutral or 
Balanced. Editorials in each category will be counted and 
measured in column inches to obtain an ove.r-all measure for 
frequency and amount of space given editorials in each category. 
----,._ 
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In addition, news stories appearing on all front 
pages of these issues will be ranked in terms of editorial 
direction: pro-Israel; anti-Arab; pro-Arab; anti-Israel, and 
Neutral or Balanced. News stories in each category will be 
counted and measured in column inches to obtain an over-all 
measure for frequency and amount of space given stories in 
each category. 
Since only front pages are included in news story 
samples, it will be relatively easy to determine how much 
front page space each newspaper assigns to news of the Middle 
East, as well as what percentage of this space falls into the 
above categories. 
Sample 
Morning dalies representing fDur major geographical 
regions of the U.S. were chosen for the study: The New York 
Times (East); St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Milwaukee Journal 
{Midwest); Houston Post (South, Southwest) and the Los Angeles 
Times (West). Morning papers were chosen because of their 
tendency to emphasize foreign news over evening papers. The 
sample will consist of the latest morning editions of these 
papers. 
Quality •elite• newspapers were selected because of 
their key influence in their respective states and cities, their 
impact with intellectuals and opinion leaders, geBeral level of 
acceptance, and reputation for setting standards for smaller 
papers in their regions. 
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In chosing •elite• papers, Merrill 1 s marks of the 
elite press were utilized: (l) Independence; financial stability; 
integrity; social concern; good writing and editing. (2) Strong 
opinion and interpretive emphasis; world consciousness; non-
sensationalism. (J) Emphasis on politics, international relations, 
economics, social welfare, cultural endeavors, education and 
science. (4) Concern with getting, developing and keeping a 
large, intelligent, well-educated staff and (5) Determination to 
serve and help expand a well-educated, intelligent readership; 
desire to appeal to and influence opinion leaders everywhere.53 
Population 
The sampling population would consist of newspaper 
issues on specific dates, during three separate years, tentatively, 
1967, 1973 and 1975. Twenty issues of each newspaper would be 
randomly selected to represent a speoific three-month period 
during each of these years. Some method of objective selection 
ot each three-month period would need to be devised to eliminate 
selector's bias. The Faets on Pile index or a similar one could 
be utilized in some manner as the basis for objective, random 
sampling of time pe r1 ods • 
The proposed sampling unit would be the calendar date. 
One approach to sampling dates, which has been tested for validity, 
is the constructed time period, devised by Carter and Jones.54 
J2 
A "constructed month' arbitrarily set at 20 days, 
would be devised for each three-month period. This would be 
done by creating an artificial month consisting of 20 days 
and by drawing calendar dates randomly from the three-month 
period (the defined universe). Selections of odd and even 
dates would be made randomly and a table of random numbers 
devised to make selections. 
A method would need to be ·developed to insure an 
equal distribution of the days of the week since news volume 
varies from day to day. Also, the weeks of the entire time 
period would need to be stratified through a system which 
would insure an equal distribution representative of the 
time period. 
Thus, 100 issues or the five newspapers would be 
examined for each year. The total sample universe would 
equal )00 newspapers. More specifically, the universe would 
consist of all editorials (for editorial opinions) and all 
front pages (for news stories) in these newspapers. 
Results 
The results of this study should prove or disprove 
the hypothesis that u.s. daily newspapers will reflect a 
consistent •pro-Israel• sentiment in editorial opinions and 
that •pro-Arab•sentiment will be minimized. 
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It should be kept in mind though, that newspapers 
are most often deper.ivrt ·on the international news agencies 
for news about the Middle East. And, as noted in previous 
studies, cited some degree of distortion and bias may originate 
with the correspondent's story. 
It is also difficult to measure what impact efforts 
of Arab and Israeli lobbyists have on public opinion and 
newspaper editors. Certainly the existence of a large Jewish 
population in the U.S. helps promote cultural identity .with 
Israel and the Zionist cause. The little exposure the nation's 
people have. had in regard to Arabs and the Muslim religion 
may make understanding and identification with the Palestinian 
cause more difficult. 
The results of this study should make clear the 
relationship between editorial bias and tone, placement, 
headlines and length of front page stories concerning the 
Middle East. Further indications would include what influence, 
if any, editorial attitude may have upon news story direction; 
and also to what extent news stories about the Middle East 
might affect editorial opinions. 
Such analysis is useful inssessing the political 
objectivity of the press in general, and gives us a picture 
of whether news distortion or bias is present. This could 
be seen if one group is given obvious favorable coverage in 
terms of headline tone, story tone, length and placement over 
another group. Regional differences in U.S. newspapers• 
coverage of the Middle East may also be indicated. 
.. ..-..... 
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Analysis should tell us what subjective evaluations 
editors may apply to front page stories containing news from 
the area. 
Results of this type of study might also aid the 
reader in gauging the trustworthiness of Middle East news 
coverage in his newspapers--as well as providing an outside 
measure of balance and objectivity on the part of editors 
and reporters. 
-........... 
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APPENDI:X 41 
Partition of Pcles ·~inG: U.S. Pelky Developments 
\\' ith the brt>nkup of the Ottoman Empire during 
w,,rld \\'11r I. PRl~~tine 's fate was left up to Great 
Brit a in . Franc~ and Ru~sin . Britnin had pled~ed to 
supp.lrt tht> indcpl'ndcnce ot the Arab areas. in corres -
P<'Ild<' llc't> durint: 1915 between Sir Henry McMahon, 
hi~h ,,,mmi~sioncr of Egypt, and Hussain ibn Ali, 
sheri( ot :\lecca. 
But. according to a secret agreement reached in 
191li by the British. French and Russian governments 
\known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement). the Arab areas 
were to be divided into British and French spheres of 
intluence and Palestine was to be internationalized. 
Arabs later cited this agreement in charging they had 
been deceived by European imperialists. 
Balfour Declaration. On Nov. 2. 191i, British 
Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour pledged in a letter to 
Lord Rothschild. leader of the British Zionists. that 
Britain would support the establishment in Palestine 
oi a "nationa! home" ior the Jewish people, on the 
clear understanding that "nothing shall be done which 
may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing 
non-Jewish communities in Palestine .. .. " 
Reaction to the Balfour Declaration in the United 
States was positive. President Woodrow Wilson en-
dorsed the statement before its publication and Con-
gress adopted a resolution approving the declaration 
in September 1922. 
U.S. Role. The United States never declared 
war on the Ottoman Empire. an ally of Germany in 
\\'orld War I, but President Wilson strongly influenced 
• the final peace settlements which set forth the basic 
boundaries of the Middle East states. His major 
contribution was the concept of interim League of 
:-:ations mandates which would eventually lead to 
independent states . 
The Cnited States sent a commission (King-Crane 
Commission) to the former Arab areas of the Ottoman 
Empire to determine their views on postwar settle-
ments. The commission's final report in 1919-never 
formally accepted by the Paris Peace Conference or 
the U.S. government-called for a serious modification 
of the "extreme Zionist program" and advised against 
the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. 
Palestine Mandate. In July 1922 the League of 
Nations approved Britain's mandate to Palestine, 
which went into force Sept. 22. 1923. The mandate 
instrument included a preamble incorporating the 
Balfour Declaration and stressing the Jewish historical 
connection with Palestine. Britain was made respon· 
sible for placing the country under such "political, 
administrative and economic conditions as will secure 
the establishment of a Jewish National Home .... " 
In the mid-1940s the push to lift restrictions-set 
forth in a 1939 British government White Paper-on 
Jewish immigration into Palestine gained support, 
especially in the United States. ( Jewi.sh migration to 
Palestine, p. 19-25) 
In August 1945, President Harry S Truman called 
for the free settlement of Palestine by Jews to the point 
consisten t with the maintenance of civ il peace. Later 
that month Truman suggested in a letter to British 
Prime :\-lin ister Clement R. At lee that an additional 
100.000 .Jews be allowed to enter Palestine. In Decem-
ber, both houses of Congress adopted a resolution urg-
ing U.S. aid in opening Palestine to Jewish immigrants 
and in building a "democratic commonwealth." 
Anglo-American Committee. In :-.lovember 1945, 
Britain. anxious to have the United States share respon-
sibility for its Paiestine policy, joined with the United 
States in deciding to create a commission to examine 
the problem of European Jews and Palestine. In the 
meantime. Britain agreed to permit an additional 
1.500 Jews to enter Palestine each month . A i5,000 
limit had been set by the 1939 White Paper. 
In April 1946 the Anglo-American Committee of 
Inquiry recommended the immediate admission of 
100.000 Jews into . Palestine, and continuation of the 
British mandate until establishment of a United ~a­
tions trusteeship . Truman immediately endorsed the 
immigration proposal but Britain stipulated prior dis-
bandment of undt>nrround .Jewish forces in Palestine. 
The President in October released a communica-
tion sent to the British government in which he ap-
pealed for "substantial immigration " into Palestine 
"at once" and expressed support for the Zionist plan 
for creation of a "viable Jewish state" in part of Pales-
tine. A British government spokesman expressed regret 
that Truman's statement had been made public 
because it might jeopardize a settlement. 
United Nations. Britain turned to the United 
Nations in early 194i, when a London conference of 
Arab and Zionist representatives failed to resolve the 
Palestinian question. The United ~ations set up an 
inquiry committee which ultimately recommended that 
Palestine be divided into two separate Arab and Jewish 
states. ~ith Jerusalem and vicinity to be an interna-
tional zone under permanent US. trusteeship. 
The United States and Soviet Union agreed on the 
partitioning of Palestine, and on Nov. 29, 194i, the 
U.N. General Assembly voted to divide Palestine. 
Britain-setting May 15, 1948. as the date its mandate 
would terminate-refused to share responsibility with 
the U.N. Palestine Commission during the transitional 
period because the U.N. solution was not acceptable 
to both sides. 
Civil war broke out shortly after the U.N. decision 
was made. In March 1948 the United States voiced 
opposition to the forcible partitioning of Palestine and 
called for suspension of the plan . The United States 
urged a special session of the General Assembly. 
In April the Security Council adopted a U.S. 
resolution call ing for a truce and a special session of 
the General Assembly. But it was too late to stop the 
division of Palestine. On May 14, the British high com-
missioner left Palestine, the state of Israel was pro-
claimed and the General Assembly voted to send a 
mediator to the Holy Land to seek a truce. 
The Un ited States granted Israel de facto recogni -
tion immediately. The Soviet Union recognized the new 
state three days later. 
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United States Economic and Military . . . 
, ....... 
rL '.S . {i.<cal .w nrs-millinn.• of dollar.< I • Total 
1946- 1953- 1962- 1946-
~ 1952 1961 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 I 1973 
ISRAEL 
---.. Econom ic ~ 221 .5 564.7 296.5 75.5 75.3 51.1 86.8 125 .3 131. 4 1,619.1 
loons 135 .0 305 .8 272.0 75.0 74.7 50.7 86.5 74.9 80.5 1, 147.5 
,- Grants 86.5 258 .9 24.4 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 50.4 50.9 471.5 
Mil itary .I 0.9 136.4 25.0 85.0 30.0 545.0 300.0 307.5 1,429.8 
r-- Credit Soles 0.9 136.4 25.0 85.0 30.0 545 .0 300.0 307.5 1,429.8 
Grants 
_..--.., ALGERIA 
Economic~ 4.6 172. 1 2.0 2.2 15.0 21.9 187.8 404.9 
loons 11.6 15 .0 21.8 187.6 236.1 
Grants 4.6 160.5 2.0 2.2 0. 1 0.2 168.8 
Military ·' 
EGYPT 
,..., Economic ~ 19.6 332.9 590.4 104.6 11.5 1,028.5 
loons 18 .0 162.7 445 .9 104.6 11.5 735.a 
""' Grants 1.6 170.2 144.5 292.7 
Military ·; 
IRAN 
Econom ic ! 42.3 618.2 307.6 42.0 7.9 46 . 1 84.8 44.5 83.2 1,259 .4 
~ loons 25.8 267.0 214.6 39.7 6.5 44 .7 83.6 42 . 1 81.9 799.3 
Grants 16.5 351.2 93 . 1 2.3 1.4 1.4 1.2 2.4 1.3 460.2 
~ Military .I 16.8 451.4 636.9 122.1 128 .3 2.6 122.14 113.6 4 200.0 4 1,794.0 
Credit Soles 299.8 100.0 104.2 504.0 
. ~, 
Grants 16.6 436. 1 332.3 22.1 23 .9 2.6 2.1 0.9 836.7 
IRAQ 
Econom ic~ 1.4 21.6 34. 1 s 0.3 0.2 2.5 0.3 0.3 57.3 
loons 0.9 25 . 1 0. 1 0.2 26 .3 
Grants 0.5 21.6 9 .0 s 0.3 0.2 2.5 0.2 0.1 31.0 
~ M ilitary -' 47 .2 0.6 47 .8 
Credit Soles 
Grants 46 . 1 0.6 46 .7 
JORDAN 
~ Econom ic ! 5 .2 275 .4 287.3 19.0 11.8 12.2 16.8 59.4 77.2 753. 1 
loons 4.7 18 .3 1.8 1.5 8.3 1.2 1.7 22 .5 56.2 
Grants 5.2 270.7 269.0 17.2 10.3 3.9 15 .6 57.7 54.7 696.9 
M ilitary :1 15 .8 55 .9 0.4 14.2 0.2 59.3 49 .3 39.7 234.7 
~ Cred it Soles 15 .0 14.0 30.0 10.0 69 .0 
Grants 15.5 37.0 0.4 0.2 0.2 28 .9 38.0 32.8 152 .8 
,.......... KUWAIT 
Economic 2 50.0 50.0 
,........ loons 50.0 50.0 
Grants 
Mil itary J 
LEBANON 
~ Econom ic 2 3.6 97.9 3.4 4.2 4.9 12.5 2.2 18 .1 1.2 127 .8 
loons 1.6 20.3 3.9 3.3 11.1 1.9 8. 1 37.2 
Grants 2.0 77.6 3.4 0.3 1.6 1.4 0.3 10.0 1.2 90.6 
Militory J 8.2 0.7 0.1 0. 1 0.1 5 .1 10.2 10.2 34.6 
~ Cred it Soles 10.0 10.0 20.0 
Gronl1 8. 1 0.7 0. 1 0.1 0. 1 5 .1 0.2 0.2 14.5 
r-- UBYA 
Economic 2 1.8 173. 1 41.4 1.7 2.2 0 .4 5 212.5 
........_ loons 8 .5 7.0 
Gr ants 1.8 164.6 41.4 1.7 2.2 0. 4 205.5 
Military J 2.7 11.8 1.1 0.4 0. 1 16. 1 
Cred it So les 
~ Gr ants 2.6 11.4 1.0 0.4 0.1 15 .4 
• Ficurr.• rna ~• rvJt add tn tt~t a i., dur to rnu ndinlt. Annual /i~ do nt)t add u p to I FiA!vn for {y cal 1973 ~/i,., inor:-·. 
cu fYtu latlt'l' tut ah b~C'®-'t'' th,. /Ucal Y"lV fiJ/urt'~ .~~incf' FY 19'\~ '~P't-• rnl nt'W 11bli- 2 Econotrtir aid totaL. i11cl~dtd of/ictal drt·rlopM t nt Gii .. L. t Mcl". Food /0' Pt arr ;JI"l'· 
~ .,n t t•• fl' 1''1 1••,.,.d tn t •t dur•nt thu.,, :~ rar.• ''" a ~,,.._, ba.. U.: thf' cumulal ivr fi11urr11 {M .rra...._ Prou COO'P<. E:, port . (mfXJ' I 8~ IOGJU and "'""llan-.>o" drr• lop""" l 
f )' I!Nii -1!/i'J orr "" a ,, , ba.'"'· rr/l~ct int lutal drn bli.ttat mtU u·lt"' fund~ ubl ~J~atrd CJNill4t1cr ond l~ P'OWfP'G.m'-
,--... 
u:r rr , ,,, ac tua/1.-..· .•prnt . ("""ll"f'1Uional CJt,.CJI'trrl_-v addrd ,4/IJ'• , ,, curnutacu·f' 
fu:ur•• ... /ttr F 'r' 1~· 19'i2 ttt lt /1 )".• prrlim incvy FY 197.1 am ount• to nbta rn f iJfu,.,•• 
111 l11t nl co•lf.4 fJ1'1 . 
,;--- SOURCE, Agency lor ln ternotionof Development 
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Assistance to the Middle East, 1946-1973 
I( ·.s. {ixcal yPars-millinru n{ dollars)• 
1946- 1953- 1962-
1952 1961 1967 
MOROCCO 
Economic: 0.3 290.4 286.4 
L<>ans 192.9 151.2 
C~ r ants 0.3 97.5 135 .3 
Military ·; 2.4 54.4 
Credit Soles 20.2 
Grants 2.4 30.4 
SAUDI ARABIA 
Economic c' 19.5 27 .9 
Loans 19.1 
Grants 0.4 27 .9 
Military ·; 62.5 185 .8 
Credit Sales 43.8 170.7 
Grants 18.4 14.8 
SUDAN 
Economic: 53.6 72.7 
Loons 10.0 39.8 
Grants 43.6 32.8 
M ilitary ·; s 2.0 
Credit Sales 1.5 
Grants 0.5 
SYRIA 
Economic J 0.4 44.9 43.1 
Loans 23.6 29 .4 
Grants 0.4 21.3 13.7 
Milirary ·' s 
Credit Sales 
Grants s 
TUNISIA 
Economic 2 0.2 242.6 282.3 
Loans 50.7 T63 .6 
Grants 0.2 192.0 118 .8 
Military ·' 5.5 20.2 
Credit Sales 2.8 0.2 
Grants 2.7 18.6 
TURKEY 
Economic 2 269.6 1,125.2 1,046.4 
loans 129.5 333.9 804.5 
Gran IS 140.1 791.3 241.8 
Military .'l 311.86 1,550.76 1,049.76 
Credit Sales 
Grants 146.1 1,519.5 982.3 
Y!:MEN A~AB itEPUBUC 
Economic 2 16.0 28.6 
loans 
Grants 16.0 28 .6 
Military.l 
Credit Sales 
Grants 
YEMEN. DEMOCRATIC REPUBUC OF 
Economic 2 
Loans 
Grants 
Military.! 
.1 .\l il ltar.: aid ,,,tal.• includf'd lhr F'OI"ti.x" A.•Ai.ttanct' Act crrdit aalr:t and ,-ant pro-
~.,•r r•m~ .rn "" '" thr chart\ rnclitcvy aid su.bcatr~ru-it>J, lilt wrll a.t lrart.~{"" frorrt t%· 
(" •'" •t .. t"l>s. uthr·r L' '"ll"C.I Qlt.d Exf>O'C · Imf)O't Hanlt mtlttory l()(Jru. 
.J lrrm r•·r·· ·l·rd a , uh ... tant•al omtlUIII of U.S. militor\' aid throu~:h chtfttnf'l.• olltf'f' than. 
tJ,, . ,, .... l.lrv F,,,.,~:n A.t .•L,Ioncf' Act crrtdit .~~air~ and ilf'Of1t P'n~rom•: nid includf'd 
1-:1,i.,,.t IIT'IP"" Honlt "uliltll")' lrlfUU n( SI~J().m illi"n. ut fY 1~71: Slnn..rn,ll ion itt. FY 
l!li .. • ·'~'IJIH~t fli''" fiJ'rlimi"41"YJ tn FY 1973. 
.S / ••. "than £~(),1~~L 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1 Total 
73 .5 44 .6 36:4 77 .5 57.6 33.1 890.3 
49.4 19.6 16.4 53 .1 47. 1 21.5 548.3 
24. 1 25.0 20.0 24 .4 10.5 11.6 342.0 
1.7 11.7 0.8 15.8 15 .9 9.9 112.3 
9.5 15 .0 15 .0 9.8 69 .4 
1.7 2.0 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.1 38.9 
12.0 13 .4 72.0 
12.0 13.4 44.5 
27 .5 
30.8 0.6 0.6 13.9 0.5 0.2 294.6 
30.0 13.2 257.7 
0.8 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.2 36.3 
0.3 0.3 s 0.1 8 .0 30.9 136.6 
0.2 7.9 28.7 66 .9 
0.3 0.1 s 0.1 0. 1 2.2 69 .7 
2.2 
1.5 
0.7 
0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 61.1 
24 .0 
0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 37 .0 
0.1 
0.1 
54.2 46.7 45.7 54.4 48 .8 16.1 768.9 
36.1 20.2 27 .2 32.1 36.0 8.5 365 .4 
18.1 26.4 18.6 22 .3 12.8 7.6 403.4 
2.6 3.5 3.2 6 .2 4. 1 1.8 47 .0 
2.2 5.2 
2.4 3.3 2.9 5.3 1.8 1.8 38 .8 
85 .8 97.5 90.2 93.7 101.8 90.0 2,917.3 
68.0 69 .4 73.7 82.8 74.9 76.1 1,667.6 
17.8 28.1 16.5 10.9 26.9 13 .9 1,249.7 
119.56 125.26 123.76 142.66 152.26 150.36 3,725 .7 
15.0 20.0 35 .0 
93.1 98.5 89.7 99 .4 60.7 58.5 3,147.9 
s s 3.2 45 .9 
s s 5.2 45.9 
s 
0.3 2.4 0. 1 0.1 2.8 
0.3 2.4 0.1 0.1 2.8 
6 n.ultry rre•iL•td a •ubJtantial amount of C..:.S. militCJf"\.' aid throutlt chc.nru'll otlt (f' 
thGn tht rt1ular ForriR" A.,Utanct' Act crrdit .•ol~• and xrnrtt pro;i,.OI'f1J. a•d ,, . 
cludt'd $1M6--million /I'Om tht liffrlt· Thr~i.ch aid protram. aa u·rlla.t $"'; 1-tnill•c.J" 
itt rxcru 1toclu Us FY 1946-.S2; rstn.J •t«h aruJ xranu o/ S.11.2-17111/ion '"f)' t~J. 
411 and t~7. -1-milliott in Fl" 1962-6i: txtru .doclu of $'~lfi4·nt•lli,," '" Fr I~"' a11d 
1'16. 7-ntillinn in FY 1969: rn·.,,.• •t«lu CJI1d J.:ranu n( .(';.l_tl."''ltit'" '" F'Y ~~~(1. 
143..2-millWn in F\' 1971. 1i6.S- millit>~t U. F't' 19;2 and 1;1.1'-ntilli"'' tprd . ' m F\' 
/97l 
SOURCE: Ac;~ency for lnternolionol Developmenl 
